

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Implementation of CIA's Stealth Analytical Effort

FROM:

D/SWR

EXTENSION

NO.

DDI 00785/2 84

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	D/SWR	Signature		1 Mar 84		<p>AH. ER 84-602 DDI 00785-84</p> <p>2 to 4 - Might prove useful, prior to your meeting 9 March tomorrow with 25X1</p> <p>4: DDCI THINKS 4-5 clearances shd be adequate - or</p>
2.	DDI			8.		
3.	DDI on					
	DDCI		0 1 MAR 1984			
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AM. ER84-602
DDI 00785-84

1 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

SUBJECT: Implementation of CIA's Stealth Analytical Effort

1. As requested, I have examined what Stealth clearances would be required to implement the program I recommended. The total comes to 25 new clearances, distributed as follows:

NIC 2 new clearances--NIO/S&T and NIO/USSR
(1 existing clearance--NIO/SP)

OSWR: SOVIET WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIALISTS

- 1 Soviet program development
- 1 Soviet Navy
- 2 Soviet space and antisatellite
- 3 Basic sciences
- 1 Conventional weapons

OSWR: STEALTH PENETRATION ANALYSIS STUDIES

- 2 Aircraft systems specialists
- 3 Air defense specialists

(The above is in addition to the three Stealth clearances now held in OSWR)

SOVA: STRATEGIC STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS

- 2 Strategic Forces specialists
- 2 Theater Forces specialists
- 1 Policy and Doctrine specialist

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SUBJECT: Implementation of CIA's Stealth Analytical Effort

SOVA: COST IMPLICATIONS/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

- 1 Military costing specialist
- 2 Soviet defense industries specialists

(SOVA currently has no Stealth clearances)

OTHER: C/STIC, D/SOVA

2. The above, if granted, represents a significant increase over the current four in OSWR and SOVA. It represents only a fraction of the people who will be involved in our analysis, but is sufficient to properly guide the effort. This many is needed because of the diverse specializations involved, from pure science, through air engagement analysis, to program costing and policy and doctrine.

3. The controller of the clearances (and indeed the whole program) is Col. Kaminski, who works for Dr. DeLauer, USDRE.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X w/o att		
2	D/DCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X w/att			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DD&T				
9	Cm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
18	AC/DCI				
19	IC/DPD/OIS				
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SUSPENSE _____ Date _____



Remarks

D/Executive Secretary
3 February 1984
Date

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Att. DDI 00785-84

2 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: CIA's Stealth Efforts

Good work on  part in responding to Senator Nunn's questions. I think this should have support and high priority.

25X1

William J. Casey

DCI

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NOFORN NOCONTRACT

DDI- 00785/84

1 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

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SUBJECT:

CIA's Stealth Efforts [redacted]

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1. Senator Nunn's questions to the Director concerning stealth during his worldwide briefing to Congress last week came at a time of increasing interest in the significance of stealth by policy level consumers. The NIO/S&T and NIO/USSR also have expressed to me concern with the rising importance of stealth to the Agency. In this memorandum I will outline what I believe we have done well, what we have not done, and recommendations for further support. [redacted]

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2. My review of our activities thus far shows that we have been primarily responding to queries from DoD (TAB 1). And in this respect, I believe we have served DoD pretty well. Our STD sponsored a seminar last fall that brainstormed possible Soviet technical responses, which will help guide our collection and analysis. What we have not done is provide much analytical support to non-DoD policymakers to assist them in determining the strategic significance of stealth. At the present time, we are not in good shape to provide this strategic significance analysis, because of both a sparsity of stealth clearances (e.g., SOVA does not have anyone cleared) and because DoD has not required of us this type of analysis and therefore has not given us sufficient information to do it. [redacted]

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3. Should you agree that we expand our analytical capabilities, we have identified three areas for attention. First, we within OSWR need to bring a more multidisciplinary team together to address the broad technical issues. We have an approach for this which is now being reviewed within the Office (TAB B). Most of this we can implement on our own, but a few more stealth clearances would be needed for program direction. [redacted]

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4. Secondly, we are not now doing any detailed technical analysis of the threat (Soviet vs US and US vs Soviet). This is fairly common in the early phases of a weapons program--the initial threat assessments are conducted by the various systems contractors using the DIA definition of the

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SUBJECT: CIA's Stealth Efforts [REDACTED]

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threat. This was true for the cruise missile at one time, too. In that case, the CIA did later enter the game and pioneered the analytical techniques to do the penetration analysis rigorously. We can pioneer this for stealth as well, but would need a number of additional clearances and much more detailed design data from DoD. [REDACTED]

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5. Thirdly, no one in the CIA is looking at what stealth means to the future of strategic and tactical warfare. This is the point that NIO/USSR was making, as well. In my view, the stealth development can revolutionize warfare tactics and equipment like no other development since that of nuclear weapons. We need to form a joint effort with SOVA to assess where these fundamental changes will occur, what Soviet responses may be (doctrine and tactics in addition to technical capabilities), what the cost of any Soviet responses would be, and how this would affect other Soviet military and civilian programs. This would require something on the order of twenty additional clearances. [REDACTED]

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6. In my view, all three of these efforts would need to be undertaken before we can properly address the queries now starting to arrive. The Director will be receiving a briefing later this month in preparation for answering Senator Nunn's questions. I think we should be prepared to propose a program to him at that time. [REDACTED]

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Attachments:
As stated

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Chief, Defensive Systems Division

SUBJECT : CIA Intelligence Support to US Stealth Programs

1. The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research of the DDI has been directly supporting US low-observable program offices since 1980. We have been directly tasked by the Department of Defense on several occasions. During February-July 1980 we provided intelligence support to the Foster Panel's decisions on the viability of various US stealth initiatives. In May 1982, OSWR provided threat analysis in support of cruise missile options decisions. An OSWR-prepared briefing on Soviet Low RCS Technology Applications and Countermeasures has been given to the NRO, CNO Staff, OUSDR&E, and several other DoD program managers. In May 1983, we were asked to present a briefing on Soviet Present and Future Capability to Detect Low Observable Vehicles. This was delivered to NRO and service program managers. In September 1983, preliminary discussions were held with USAF on a costing study of Soviet responses to stealth. We were asked to perform analysis of the Soviet threat to an Air Force Tactical Air Command Program in November 1983. Finally, we are involved both as threat analysis support and as full members of an ongoing Defense Science Board study of US responses to Soviet stealth initiatives. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. In addition, we have taken several initiatives in order better to support policy makers. In January 1983, the DDCI requested an assessment of Soviet stealth technology in order to initiate DO collection requirements. An intelligence assessment about to be published grew out of our initial report to the DDCI. We have focused collection requirements and provided tutorials on stealth technology to all-source collectors. OSWR tasked the Office of Research and Development of DDS&T to investigate six unorthodox approaches to detection of low observable vehicles. During 5-7 July 1983, we sponsored a study on likely Soviet responses to US low observable air vehicles. Currently, we are conducting parametric studies on Soviet air defense weapon systems vs low observable air vehicles. [REDACTED] 25X1

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SUBJECT: CIA Intelligence Support to US Stealth Programs

3. For completeness, among the activities of other Intelligence Community members of which we are aware, Foreign Science and Technology Center of the Army is investigating Soviet materials related to stealth applications. A group at the Naval Intelligence Support Center is performing similar activities. Lastly, the Foreign Technology Division of Air Force has recently established a task force to study Soviet stealth technology and applications.

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